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In biometric identification, a fingerprint is typically represented as a set of
minutiae which are 2-D points. We are interested in ways of extracting
information from such a point set template for robust authentication. This
thesis consists of two parts. In the first part, we show that analysis of an
existing method, Fingerprint vault[6], is inadequate. As such, the security
of such method may be too weak in practice. More specifically, we propose
an attacker who achieves 2192.7 times speedup compared with a brute-force
attacker whom they used to measure the security of fingerprint vault. In the
second part, we propose a new method to extract information from 2-D point
set by using feature lines and PCA transformation. We name this scheme as
approximate message authentication code for 2-D point set to produce MAC
like binary code for robust fingerprint authentication. Given such a 128-bit
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Fingerprint templates, as well as many other biometric templates, are typi-
cally expressed as 2-D point sets, see Figure 1.1. Since every different scan
of a same finger probably gives similar but not exactly the same point set,
extracting consistent secret bits from the point set is difficult. On the other
hand, consistent secret bits is a pre-requisite for cryptographic applications.
For example, using the fingerprint as the symmetric secret key during encryp-
tion. Hence, it is an important problem to study the methods of extracting
consistent secret bits from 2-D point sets.
1.1 Background
Authentication
According to the definition of Bishop[3], Authentication is the binding
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of an identity to a subject. There are three classes of functions could be
used to produce authentication information: message encryption , message
authentication code and hash function[18]. A message authentication code
is a public function of the message and a secret key which produces a fixed
length value which serves as the identity information in authentication. More
specifically, if usingmessage authentication code (MAC) as the authentication
function, we may have following authentication process: Given a document,
say D, which is supposingly originated from Alice. MAC is an additional
piece of information appended to D, and to facilitate authenticity verification.
Typically, Alice would compute a MAC based on D and a key KAlice
MAC = Encode(D,KAlice)
Now, givenMAC and D, Bob wants to check whether D is indeed originated
from Alice. He runs the verification using key KBob. Under the symmetric
scenarios, KBob is the same as KAlice. The verification output Accept or
Reject.
V erification(D,MAC,KBob)
There are a few requirements for this authentication process:
1. If the MAC is indeed computed by Alice, the verification must output
ACCEPT.
2. MAC should be short to be easy for verification.
3. If MAC 6= Encode(D,KAlice), the verification should output reject
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with high probability.
Authentication using Fingerprints on Smart-card
Recently, a technique of combining fingerprints and smart-cards is applied
to individual IC. The technique prints a clear version of fingerprint X on IC
together with it’s hash version H(X) stored inside the card. Upon authenti-
cation process, the fingerprint X ′ printed on smart-card is scanned through
a machine and feeded to a hash function. If the output hash value H(X ′)
matches the value H(X) stored in the smart-card, the authentication process
outputs YES.
If a malicious user obtains such an IC of someone S, he is able to change
the fingerprint X printed on the card to his own Y , but he is not able to
hack into the card to change the hash value H(X). When he presents this
card to an authority agency A to pretend to be S, A calculates H(Y ) and
finds H(Y ) 6= H(X). Hence A could immediately reject the malicious user.
Noises in Fingerprint Templates
Authentication in fingerprint templates, as well as most of the biometric
templates, is different from traditional cryptographic authentication because
of the noises introduced in different places. For example, in fingerprint con-
text, each scan of a same finger might be different possibly due to the hard-
ness of your press, the cleanliness of your finger and many other reasons.
Hence, from each scan you might get slightly different minutiae set.
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There are mainly two kinds of noises in fingerprint, white noises and
replacement noises, See Figure 1.1. 1:
• White noises means during fingerprint scanning process, the minutiae
points may perturb to a nearby location.
• Replacement noisemeans during the fingerprint scanning process, some
original minutiae may not be captured and some new minutiae may be
introduced.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.1: (a) The original fingerprint. The dots are the extracted minutiae.
(b) The dots are the original minutiae. The “+” are minutiae extracted from
another scan of the same finger.
A typical minutiae set will consists of around 30 minutiae points. A
noise version of minutiae set may introduce around 10% of the replacement
noise and 90% of the white noise. The white noise usually follows Gaussian
distribution with very small variance.
1Fingerprint raw image is obtained from [1]
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The traditional cryptographic authentication schemes don’t take into ac-
count that the input documents may contain permissive amount of noises. In
addition, we find in fingerprint template and many other 2-D point sets, the
noises are closely related to the positioning information of each point, which
is not captured by the classic cryptographic authentication schemes either.
Therefore in designing authentication function for noisy fingerprint data,
we need to ensure the scheme has two more abilities than a classic crypto-
graphic authentication function, i.e. Robustness and Sensitivity:
1. Robustness is the ability to tolerate permissive amount of noises from
the input templates;
2. Sensitivity is the ability to detect the templates which have been tam-
pered above some noisy threshold.
We further notice that authentication using biometric information has
been studied for a long time, however, extracting authentication information
from biometric information is relatively a new chapter.
Existing Methods to Handle Noisy Data
The most genetic approach [8] to do robust authentication is to use con-
struction of secure sketch/fuzzy extractor. They could produce locality pre-
serving hashes which tolerate certain amount of noises while still being sen-
sitive to large factor of difference. BCH(Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem)[13]
code is initialized for error correction in their proposal.
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Implementation of secure sketch/fuzzy extractor like algorithms is first
proposed by Juel in [12] called fuzzy commitment scheme, which employs
hamming distance error correction to recover data from noises.
Later, fuzzy vault scheme is proposed by [11] with the concept of Locking
set and Unlocking set. They add all points in original minutiae template and
large amount of other points to the Locking set, such that all the points in
original template satisfy a polynomial while the other points don’t. Reed-
Solomon decoding schemes is employed to work together with Unlocking set
to recover template back from replacement noises.
[6] proposed Fingerprint vault scheme which brings in the idea of fuzzy
vault scheme. It adds randomly generated chaffs to the original minutiae set
to build a public sketch called fingerprint vault. It tries to confuse people by
these chaff points since we are unable to distinguish original minutiae from
chaff without the helps of any additional information. The fingerprint vault
can be used to recover templates from white noises and Reed-Solomon[20]
error correcting code is employed to handle the replacement noises.
A variance of MAC(message authentication code), AMAC(approximate
message authentication code) is firstly proposed by Graveman[9] for robust
image authentication. It produces MAC like binary code and is able to
authenticate messages with permissive noises/alters.
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1.2 Motivation
As we described in the previous section, fingerprint vault scheme adds ran-
dom chaff points C to the original minutiae set X and publishes the sketch
PX = X ∪ C. By the simple observation on PX , a brute-force attacker who
tries to find X out of PX would have to enumerate all |X|-size subsets of PX
unless additional information is provided. Suppose |X| = s and |PX | = m,






trials to find X. This complexity has been used
to measure the security of fingerprint vault scheme. However, an interesting
question would be: Is it possible to distinguish X from C? or Is
there a smart attacker who could perform better than brute-force
attackers?
In addition, with all those requirements introduced in the Section 1.1 for
robust authentication on fingerprint templates, we find fingerprint vault is
not ideal for being the authentication information, because firstly, we want
to extract only a small MAC-size code for cryptographic usage; and secondly,
the fingerprint vault always contains the correct information of the original
minutiae. Later we are inspired by [9, 2, 21, 7], where the concept of Approx-
imate Message Authentication Code and many of its variances are proposed
for robust image authentication, e.g. 8192-bit difference in a 1 megabyte (223
bit) image file results in an expected 7.07-bit difference in the output 128-bit
AMAC code. If we could produce similar locality preserving hashes from
2-D point sets, we can use the hashes as keys for encryption or other crypto-
graphic usage, and classic secure sketch on bits can be used to recover noises
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on them. This leads to a second question: Would it be possible to de-
sign such an AMAC code for 2-D point sets, such as fingerprint
templates?
1.3 Problem Definitions
Motivated by two questions in 1.2, we formally define our problems in this
section:
Finding original minutiae hidden among the chaff
We express fingerprint template as 2-D point set X, where each point
xi ∈ X is a minutiae points extracted from a finger. Each point will have a
pair of Euclidean coordinates (x, y) respected to a domain of size [0, n]×[0, n].
The chaff set C will be generated randomly and the chaff point will be added
to the domain one by one with constraints that no distance between any two
points in the domain will be greater than δ. After we combined X and C
together to get a sketch PX = X ∪C, we observe a point set and we are not
able to tell which point is an original minutia and which point is chaff point.
Our first problem will be to find X out of PX given only the information
about PX .
Design robust authentication function: AMAC for 2-D point set
We now consider more general cases, where the authentication targets are
2-D point-sets, such as fingerprint templates, handwritten images and other
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biometric information. Our second problem is to design a method to ex-
tract information from these point sets and produce a robust authentication
function: AMAC for 2-D point set. It should satisfy following properties:
• AMAC is able to authenticate a message to an identity
• AMAC ensures robustness and sensitivity with high probability
• AMAC outputs small fixed length binary code
• AMAC resists to preimage attacks.
1.4 Contributions
The two main contributions of this thesis are:
1. A smart attack model to fingerprint vault scheme is proposed, which
finds original minutiae points hidden among the chaff 2192.7 times
faster than a brute-force attacker. In extremely cases, we may have 107
times speed up compared with a brute-force attacker.[5]
2. We propose a general robust authentication function: AMAC for 2-D
point set templates, such as fingerprint templates, watermarks, hand-
written images and other image templates. This function can pro-
duce bit strings which could be used for further construction of secure
sketches. A naive version of AMAC for 2-D point set templates can
resist to pre-image attacks with complexity around 281.
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Attack Model on Fingerprint Vault Scheme
We observe that a chaff point generated later tends to have smaller freedom
space around it. We utilize this observation and experiment out the proba-
bility lookup table with freedom space and probability of being a minutiae as
attributes. Then we can obtain the approximate likelihood for any |X| size
subset of PX to be the original minutiae set. By querying a blackbox accord-
ing to the likelihood, we achieved our speedup in finding minutiae compared
with brute-force attackers.
We find if the number of minutiae |X| = 1 and the average vault size
|R| = 312.6, using the brute-force search needs 156.5 queries, whereas using
our method, we need only 100.0 queries on average. If |X| = 38, our method
achieves a speedup of 2192.7 by choosing the Lookup appropriately.
Build AMAC for 2-D Point Sets Authentication with robustness
We propose using a transformation to map the point set to a high di-
mension Euclidean space. By doing so, we can apply known secure sketch
technique to extract consistent secret bits for authentication.
We find if we draw a line l intersecting with the 2-D point set X, we will
have some points on one side of this line, denoted as set L, while others on
the other side, denoted as set R. The difference |L| − |R| is considered as
a feature value FVX(l) corresponding to l on X. If we have large number
of such lines and large number of possible 2-D point sets, we could build
a matrix M with each row as different FVX(li) for one point set X and
different lines l1, l2, ..., ln; and each column as the feature values FVXj (l) for
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a single line l with multiple possible underlaying point sets X1, X2, ...Xs. We
then perform PCA transformation on M and obtain a set of basis B.
Given any 2-D point set template, we generate the AMAC code in the
following way: 1. extract the information from the 2-D point set; 2. project
it to B to get a projected vector VB; 3. quantize VB to a fixed length binary
string such as 128 bits.
If we allows no more than 1% noises, the probability of finding a template
mapping to a given AMAC code is only 1.10 × 10−24. It means around 281
trials are needed in order to find a point set mapping to a similar AMAC
value.
1.5 Organization
In Chapter 2, we will introduce the related work in the authentication area,
especially for robust authentication function suitable for fingerprint tem-
plates. The first main part of the thesis (Chapter 3,4,5) is to solve the
problem of finding minutiae hidden from chaff. In Chapter 3, we model fin-
gerprint vault scheme and describe point generation process; then in Chapter
4, we propose our attack model to find the minutiae hidden among the chaff
and in Chapter 5, we support our findings by showing experiment results.
The second main part of this thesis is to propose the method for extracting
consistent bits from 2-D point sets. In Chapter 6, we give a design for AMAC
for 2-D point set protocol; in Chapter 7, the effectiveness and boundaries of
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the protocol are analyzed ; in Chapter 8, we present the experiments which





2.1 MAC and Hash Functions
A cryptographic message authentication code (MAC) is used to authenti-
cate a message. A MAC algorithm usually uses hash functions to provide
underlaying secrecy. Hash function is designed according to one-way, strong-
collision resistance, weak-collision resistance criteria. The nice property for
MAC code is it ensures the integrity of the message, but sometimes, it is
too strict to have one message strictly mapping to a MAC since robustness
is required for many types of messages, especially for messages involving the
positioning. The information may be masked by noises, e.g. fingerprint tem-
plates, images with watermarks, and so on. Or else, the messages captured
may not always be the same, yet they follow similar patterns from time to
time, e.g. autographs, facial images, and so on. Other than this, we find
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cryptographic MAC is more comfortable to deal with binary documents, but
lacks of ability to process fingerprint templates, or more generally, 2-D point
sets. The limitation of classic cryptographic urges us to invent a more appro-
priate approach to map this class of information to message authentication
codes.
2.2 Secure Sketch, Fuzzy Extractor
Dodis [8] formally defined secure sketch and fuzzy extractor for turning bio-
metric information into keys usable for any cryptographic application as well
as reliably and securely authenticating biometric data. They also proposed
3 constructions: hamming distance, set difference and edit difference. The
entropy loss for these constructions is about the same according to their
analysis. BCH-based secure sketch[13], is constructed to solve set difference
scenarios.
A secure sketch SS(·) is a deterministic function produces a random string
SS(w) for a uniform distributed biometric template w. It has the ability to
recover the w given an input w′ that is close enough to w by a recover
function Rec(w′, SS(w)) = w. The limitation of a secure sketch is it only
accepts uniform template inputs.
A fuzzy extractor is similar to secure sketch but is able to handle inputs
of non-uniform distributed biometric templates. It could generate uniformly
random string R and P (which are stored for authentication) from biometric
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input w. If an input w
′
is close enough to w, we could recover R by feeding
w
′
and P to a reproduction function.
More specifically, we denote PX as the secure sketch generated from a
template X. PX has the property that: given a template Y and a secure
sketch PX , we are able to recover X only if Y is close to X. The closeness
here reflects the robustness we can tolerate.
2.3 Secure Sketch Implementations
Many secure sketch implementations try to do error correction on the noisy
input data. Two main approaches of error correcting in constructing secure
sketches are: 1. biometric templates are expressed in the vectors form where
the distance could be measured using hamming distance; 2. biometric tem-
plates are abstracted to point sets, where the distance of two template is
measured through set difference.
Fuzzy commitment scheme [12] is one of the earliest approach of handling
error tolerance on noisy input using hamming distance.
Set difference is a new way of producing secure sketches, which is firstly
mentioned in fuzzy vault scheme [11]. It uses Reed-Solomon algorithm[20]
underlaying, and is able to correct up to n−k
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errors, where n is the number
of secrets and k is the order of a polynomial function.
In [6], fingerprint vault scheme is proposed to apply the fuzzy vault scheme
to fingerprint authentication. The fingerprint vault scheme consists of two
parts: The first part is to extract a public point set R = (X ∪ C), where
X is the set containing original minutiae points and C is a set of random
chosen chaff points added to X. The whole set R is δ-separated, where
any two points in R are apart by at least δ distance. The points in C are
selected one by one following follow process: 1. select a random point in 2-D
template space, 2. if this point is within δ distance of any points in X or
any selected chaff points, we discard it, otherwise, we add it into C. The
selection process would be repeated until no more chaff points could be added
or sufficient amount of points have been selected. The second part is to do
authentication with robustness.
Recently, Chang[4] proposed small secure sketch for point set difference,
where set reconciliation[15] technique is used.
However, all of these schemes don’t produce small fixed length secure
sketch. They either keep the whole encoded information or add more re-
dundant information to confuse people. Whereas in authentication, we are
more comfortable to keep only small compressed trunks of binary strings.
Further more, many biometric point sets are not suitable for being projected
to Euclidean space directly.
Shielding function is an implementation of fuzzy extractor which works
on continues domain. It relies on δ-contracting,ǫ-revealing function. It uses
challenge and response approach with the involvement of public database.[14]
However, the involvement of a third party makes the problem complicated.
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2.4 AMAC AIAC and AIMAC
Another totally different approach is the construction of approximate mes-
sage authentication codes[9, 2, 21, 7] on robust image authentications, where
images that are corrupted by certain levels of noises can be authenticated
successfully by the AMAC code.
The first version of AMAC[9] consists of three steps: Initialization, For-
matting and Randomization, Two Rounds of Majority Calculation.
• Initialization The key K and initial vector I are selected and they are
used to seed the PRNG.
• Formatting and Randomization The message M is padded with zeros
to the length of L × R × S and then chopped into L columns with
R × S rows each. The result matrix would be masked by a new set of
pseudo-random bits generated by P, which could be denoted as T0.
• Two Rounds of Majority Calculation First round is to take R rows
from T0 at a time to form S subarrays. For each of R rows and L




0 . For each T
k
0 , we compute
the majority bits of that column. Hence a new matrix T of S × L is
formed. Second round is to carry out majority of each column of T to
obtain L bits. These L is output as the AMAC.
The intermediate steps look very similar to the cryptographic hash func-
tion design, such as MD5 and SHA-1. However, this scheme doesn’t capture
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the positioning information between the objects/pixels in the images.
Later, Xie[21] proposed Approximate Image Message Authentication Codes
to address the above problem. In stead of processing direct on rows and
columns, she divides the image into blocks to preserve the locality infor-
mation. She also introduces a guarding zone in the image’s histogram by
transforming it and creating a gap around the threshold. However, the re-
sult is mainly empirical and is lack of reasoning.
Other attempts are studied to refine the extraction of biometric features
so that the features are invariant to permissible noises[22]. However, such
system doesn’t have high reliability.
2.5 Principle Components Analysis
Principal components analysis (PCA) [10] simplifies a dataset using linear
transformation. The linear transformation chooses a new coordinate system
for the dataset such that first few coordinates in the new system reflect the
most important features of the dataset. PCA is also called the Karhunen-
Loeve transform or the Hotelling transform. PCA provides optimal linear
transformation for keeping the subspace that has largest variance. Unlike
other linear transformation, the PCA does not have a fixed set of basis vec-








We study the fingerprint vault’s chaff points generation process which is mod-
eled as online parking process[17]. Notice that the chaff points are generated
one by one in a randomly and uniformly manner. We observe that a chaff
point that is generated later tends to have smaller freedom space around
it. We would define this freedom as free area formally later. Based on this
observation, we perform extensive simulations and indeed verify the different
location arrangement between points would affect a point’s likelihood to be
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a minutia. We also admit that if all the points in the vault are purposely
distributed with equal/similar distance, we will have difficulty in applying
our method to distinguish the original points from chaff.
Based on online parking process, we build a Lookup table through experi-
ments, where the first column indicates the free area and the second column
is the corresponding probability for this point to be a minutiae. Hence, given
the number of minutiae k in a fingerprint vault, we could calculate the prob-
ability likelihood for any k points to be the original minutiae set. Starting
from the highest probability to the lowest probability, we check whether the
k points are the original minutiae set by querying a blackbox. We use the
number of queries we send as the measurement to compare with a brute-force
attacker. The ratio between two queries, namely, the brute-force way’s query
number over our way’s query number is obtained from experiments.
3.2 Notations
X, Y : X is the set of the original minutiae. Y is
a noisy version of X.
s : Number of minutiae. s = |X|.
C,R,m : C is the set of chaff. R = X ∪ C and
m = |R|.
n : Width of the domain. All points are in
[0, n]× [0, n].
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PX : PX is the sketch generated from X.
A(W ) : Available region of a point set W .
F
eR
(x),F(x) : Free area of x in the point set R˜.
LookUp : Look up table used by the attackers.
Ax : The arrival order of x, given that x is
selected.
3.3 Online Parking Process
The online parking problem is initially introduced from such a scenario: We
have a single line car park which is represented as an interval [0, x], x is a
large positive number. Each car (with unit width) arrives at the car park
follows Poisson process and it chooses a number y from [0, x− 1] uniformly
and randomly. If the interval [y, y+1] is empty, the car parks in that slot, and
if the interval overlaps with some previous arrived cars, it tries the process
again, because two cars are not allowed to park with overlapping. Cars keep
on arriving until it cannot find any slots which is able to fit them. The mean
value of cars can fit in this interval is called Re´nyi’s Parking Constants[17].
In 2-D, we selects a set of points one-by-one uniformly and randomly from
the domain [0, n]× [0, n] as in 1-D. Since it is in 2-D, we consider the radius
0.5 circle centered at each point as a car. If a point is within unit distance
from any previously selected points, which means the car overlaps with a
previous car, it is discarded. If not, it is selected. The process is repeated
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until the stopping condition is met. We refer this way of point generation
process as Online Parking Process. Two stopping conditions are defined as
follows:
1. The 2-D parking process is repeated until no more points can be se-
lected.
2. The 2-D parking process is repeated until a predetermined number of
points are selected.
We will use the first termination condition to generate the sketch PX . We
also studies the effects of the second condition in Section 5.6.
For each selected point, if it is the k-th point selected, then we say that
its arrival order is k.
3.4 Fingerprint Vault Generation Process
A fingerprint vault, which is referred as a sketch PX = X ∪ C, consists of
two parts: X as a set of minutiae points and C as a set of chaff. We first
generate X and then generate C.
We define the minutiae set X as a set of s points chosen from domain
[0, n] × [0, n]. The set X is δ-separated, where δ = 1. We use X to recover
white noise using its δ-separated property. Although in reality the minutiae
might follow some distribution, we only consider the more general case, where
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the minutiae points are also obtained from online parking process mentioned
in the previous section. We feel that with the knowledge of minutiae dis-
tribution, we are able to distinguish minutiae from chaff better, and we are
able to design better Lookup functions which increase our speedup compared
with brute-force attackers even more.
We define the chaff set C as a set of points generated one by one using
the same online parking process. The difference between the C and X in our
model is that, X contains all the points whose arrival orders are less than or
equal to |X| = s, but C contains all the points whose arrival orders are larger
than s. The set C is used to recover replacement noise. For example, Juels
et al. [11] proposed using a polynomial of degree (s− 2t+ 1), and employed
RS in decoding. t is the number of replacement noises can be corrected by
the sketch. All the points in X satisfy the polynomial while all the points in
C don’t.
The fingerprint vault PX reveals some level of information of X, since a
minutia point in X must be one of the point in PX . Further more, in reality,
since the sketch tolerates some mount of replacement noises, using less than
|X| = s points, we might be able to pass the authentication.
3.5 Attacking Model
The goal of attackers is to find a subset Y with size |X| which satisfies
Y = X. The attackers are allowed to present such a Y set to a blackbox
23
for confirmation. We define the effectiveness of the attack as the number of
queries an attacker would send to this blackbox. The blackbox is a function
which takes in a set of points Y , and replies YES if Y = X, where X is
the original minutiae set embedded in the fingerprint vault PX , or replies NO
otherwise. In practice, a blackbox can be designed to extract a key from the
input point set and use this key to perform an encryption on a file. If the
encrypted file matches a system stored version, the blackbox outputs YES,
otherwise outputs NO.
In reality, an attacker may try to send smart queries to the blackbox with
the helps from the techniques such as Reed Solomon Code or BCH code.
However, in this model, we assume attackers do not have the knowledge
about these error correcting codes. Further more, we assume the oﬄine
calculation is also not counted in measuring the effectiveness of the attacks.
It is more appropriate and convenient to count only the blackbox calls since
usually, a black box is a remote server which attackers may only have limited
access to and attackers may have huge local computational powers.
3.6 Brute-force attacker
We call a set Y a candidate of a given sketch(fingerprint vault), if Y is a
subset of PX and |Y | = |X|. A brute-force attacker will extract a candidate
Y from PX and sends Y to the blackbox we defined earlier. He will query
the blackbox using all possible candidates consistent with the given sketch






when |X ∪C| = m. They are the candidates a brute-force attacker may send
to the blackbox.
Notice the replacement sketch can also reduce the number of possible
candidates. If the replacement sketch can correct up to t errors, and the
set-difference scheme [11] is employed, then the average number of candidate






We assume that the brute-force attacker is lack of knowledge about what
error correcting code the blackbox is using. Hence, the expected number
of queries required by a brute-force attacker is half of the total number of
candidates.
3.7 Definition of Free area
Definition 1. Given a set of points W , define A(W ), the available region,
to be the set
A(W ) = {x ∈ [0, n]× [0, n] : for all w ∈W, ‖x− w‖2 > 1}.
We can add a point in the available region toW if and only if after adding
the point, W still remains separated with the condition that ‖w1−w2‖2 > 1
for any w1, w2 ∈W .
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Definition 2. For a point set R˜ and a point x ∈ R˜, define the free area of
x with respect to R˜ as,
F
eR
(x) = |A(R˜− {x})−A(R˜)|, (3.1)
where “−” is the set difference operator, and | | gives the area of the region.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the free area. For convenience reason, we omit R˜
and write the free area as F(x).
Point X
Figure 3.1: Illustration of free area. FR(x) is the area of the shadow. Each
circle is a unit disk.
Consider the online parking process. Let Ax be the random variable on
the arrival order of x, given that x is selected. Let us write F(x) = f as the
event that x is selected and contained in some point set, and its free area in
that point set is f . We are interested in the conditional probability
Pr(Ax ≤ s | F(x) = f). (3.2)
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Since X and C follow the distribution of online parking, we can treat R
as the output of an online parking process. Hence, if the arrival order of x
is not more than s, x is a minutia. Although the attackers know the point
set R, the conditional probability (3.2) doesn’t explore the full knowledge
of R. Instead, only the free area of x is used. Nevertheless, such partial
information is sufficient for us to distinguishing the minutiae from chaff.
3.8 Differences from Clancy et al. method.
The model we designed has two differences from the original fingerprint vault
model proposed by Clancy et al. [6]. Firstly, we measure the effectiveness
of an attacker by the number of queries to the blackbox. Whereas Clancy
et al. considered the computational complexities required by the attacker,
and the authentic user during decoding process(with respect to a specific
decoding algorithm). The effectiveness of an attacker is defined as the ratio
of the steps taken by the attacker over the authentic user. Secondly, Clancy
et al. stopped generating more points when a predetermined number of
sketch points is reached so that the authentic user can decode efficiently. We
assume the attacker has strong computational power and do not consider the
decoding complexity and hence generate as many chaff points as possible.
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Chapter 4
Attacks to Fingerprint Vault
Based on Conditional
Probability
Our main observation is that, for f0 > f1 and any s,
Pr( Ax ≤ s | F(x) = f0) > Pr( Ax ≤ s | F(x) = f1). (4.1)
That is, for a R randomly generated by online parking, if a point x ∈ R has
larger free area compared to another point y in R, it is more likely that x
arrived earlier than y. This is intuitive when we have an empty space, if now
we throw only one disk into the space, it can be located at anywhere within
the boundary. However, after we already have such a disk in the space, we
throw in another disk, provided it cannot overlap with the previous disk, we
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have less freedom or fewer choices to put it.
Unfortunately, we are unable to analytically prove the observation be-
cause many of the related problems are remained open since 1950s [16].
Nevertheless, we have extensive simulations to support the claim and obser-
vation. Figure 5.2 shows an estimation of the likelihood function. Note that
each function is increasing with respect to the free area.
4.1 Identifying one point, s = 1
We start from simple case s = 1, that is, there is only one minutia point in
the fingerprint vault, X = 1. Suppose we have obtained a sketch PX , we have
all the candidates as singleton subsets of PX . Recall all the minutiae and
chaff are both generated using the online parking process. In this scenario,
an attacker is to find the very first point that arrives in the point generation
process. Suppose a sketch PX hasm points, then a brute-force attacker needs
to send m/2 queries to the blackbox on average.
Instead of randomly choosing a candidate to query the blackbox, our
attacker carries out the following steps:
1. The attacker computes F(x) for all x ∈ PX .
2. Next, it lists down all the points in PX in decreasing order with respect
to F(x) value. Since we believe a point that arrives later in the online
parking process tends to have small F(x) value, we send the points in
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this order one by one to the blackbox until a YES is returned.
4.2 Likelihood of the first s points
In online parking process, we notice the later generated points are restricted
by the previous generated points. Hence the online parking process is not
memoryless and there is dependency between two points. Particularly, Pr(Ax <
s) > Pr(Ax < s|Ay < s) since if a previously point has arrival order less than
s, the later coming points will have less chance to be the first s points.
Nevertheless, with the assumption that x and y are not close to each
other, the effect of one point on the other should not be significant. Hence,
we employ the following approximation:
Pr(Ax ≤ s, Ay ≤ s | F(x) = f1,F(y) = f2) ≈
Pr(Ax ≤ s | F(x) = f1) · Pr(Ay ≤ s | F(y) = f2). (4.2)
Using (4.2), we can obtain an approximation of the likelihood for each
candidate consistent to PX . This leads to the following attacker:
1. Computes the likelihood of each candidate consistent to PX .
2. Enumerates the candidates in decreasing order with respect to their
likelihood. Next, send the enumerated candidates to the blackbox until
the blackbox outputs YES.
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For example, if the candidate is {x1, x2, ..., xs}, we denote the value∏s
i=1 LookUp(F(xi)) as the likelihood of each candidate, where LookUp is
a predeterminate function using simulation.
We assume if an attacker has sent a few candidates to the blackbox and
they are all not the correct original, the attacker will not use this informa-
tion to choose the next candidate. However, in the reality, an attacker may
immediately discard a candidate set of points if he tries several times with
small modifications on that candidate.
In our simulation, we experiment with various ways to estimate the likeli-
hood. Since in
∏s
i=1 LookUp(F(xi)), we use the estimation 4.2, which in fact
underestimates the likelihood of a candidate to be X. Hence we try to use
identity function as lookup, that is, LookUp(i) = i, this actually increase the
likelihood to a more accurate value. We find the identity lookup function
can achieve noticeable speedup over the brute-force-attacker.
4.3 Min-entropy retained by publishing the
sketch
Measuring the remaining entropy is a way to judge the security of a secure
sketch. The sketch PX is made public, hence there is information leakage
on the original minutiae point set. We want the remaining entropy to stay
high so that it is less risky to publish the fingerprint vault. For convenience
reason, Dodis et al. [8] proposed the concept of min-entropy of A given B,
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which is,
H˜∞(A|B) = − log(Eb←B[max
a
Pr(A = a|B = b)]). (4.3)
We denote X and PX as the random variables for the minutiae and the
sketch respectively, the min-entropy loss due to the sketch is defined as,
H∞(X)− H˜∞(X|PX),
where the min-entropy H∞(X) = − log (maxa Pr(X = a)).
Online parking is not easy to analyze due to the reason that many basic
properties are mathematically open problems. Hence the bound on the en-
tropy loss also seems to be difficult to obtain. We take an alternative and
estimate the entropy loss by simulations and the approximation (4.2), we can
obtain an estimation of
max
{x1,x2,...,xs}
Pr(X = {x1, . . . , xs}|FR(x1), . . . ,FR(xs)). (4.4)
Note that for random variables A and B, and a deterministic function f ,
max
a
Pr(A = a|B = b) ≥ max
a
Pr(A = a|f(B) = f(b)).
Therefore, by substituting A with X, B with PX and f with F , we have
maxa Pr(X = a|PX = R) is greater or equal to the likelihood in (4.4). We
use this to estimate an upper bound on the min-entropy, which in turn gives
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For convenience, we simulate the online parking process on the discretized
domain [0, n]×[0, n]. Therefore, minutiae and chaff points are selected from a
set of discrete points. Each unit interval is discretized into 100 points. Hence,
there are 1002 points in [0, 1)×[0, 1). For each experiment, we collected 10000
samples. Each sample is a point set R obtained through online parking. For
each point in R, its arrival order is recorded and its free area is approximated
by counting the discrete points in the area.
The experiments are conducted in [0, n] × [0, n] for n = 50 and n = 22.
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The average |R| is 1668.4 and 312.6 for n = 50 and n = 22 respectively.
By treating each point as a disk of diameter 1, the average packing density
(for both n = 50 and n = 22) is about 0.525. This is slightly less than the
Palasti’s conjecture[16] of 0.559, probably due to the different treatment of
the domain boundary.
We also conducted experiments in 1-D. That is, the domain is the interval
[0, n], and for any two selected points x and y, |x − y| ≥ 1. The free area
of a 1-D point x can be defined similarly as in (3.1). In 1D, the free area of
x is simply (xr − xl − 2) where xr and xl is the right and left neighbors of






















Figure 5.1: Probability density function, Pr(Ax ≤ s ∩ F (x) = f), for s =
165, 300 and 495. The domain is [0, n]× [0, n] where n = 50.
35
From the 10000 samples, we can estimate the conditional probability
Pr(Ax ≤ s | F(x) = f) by first estimating Pr((Ax ≤ s) ∩ (F(x) = f)) and
Pr(F(x) = f). Figure 5.1 plots Pr((As ≤ s) ∩ (F(x) = f)) against the free
area f for different s. A function in Figure 5.2 shows Pr(F (x) = f) with
respect to f . Observe in Figure 5.2 that a large proportion of points have
small free space. In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, for points that
arrive early, relatively small proportion of them have small free space. This
implies that, given that a point has large free area, it is more likely to have
arrived early, and hence more likely to be a minutia.
Figure 5.2 shows the likelihood function for different s. Note that Pr(Ax ≤
s | F(x) = f) is increasing as a function of f . Since the average |R| is 1668.4,
the probability that a randomly chosen point from R to arrive not later than
165 is about 0.1. From the graph, the likelihood Pr(Ax ≤ 165 | F(x) = 50)
is more than 0.15. Hence a point with free area more than 50 is 1.5 times as
likely to arrive not later than 165, compared to a randomly chosen point.
Similar observations can be made for experiments in the 1D domain,
illustrated in Figure 5.3.
For different n and s, it seems that the conditional probabilities are almost
the same as long as the ratio (s/nd) is the same, where d is the dimension of






















Figure 5.2: Distribution of free area, Pr(F (x) = f), and conditional prob-
ability of arrival order given free area, Pr(Ax < s|F (x) = f), for different






















Figure 5.3: Distribution of free area, Pr(F (x) = f), and conditional prob-
ability of arrival order given free area, Pr(Ax < s|F (x) = f), for differ-
ent s = 100, 200, 300. The domain is [0, n] where n = 1340. The average
|R| = 994.8.
5.3 Brute-force-attacker for s = 1
When |X| = 1, our attacker simply computes LookUp(x) for all x ∈ R, and





















n = 50, s = 165
n = 35.5, s = 85 
n = 50, s = 330
n = 35.5, s = 170
n = 50, s = 495
n = 35.5, s = 255
Figure 5.4: Comparison of Pr(Ax < s|F (x) = f) with different n and s.
There are 3 pairs of functions. For each pair, the ratio (s/nd) is approximately
the same. For example, (165/502) ≈ (85/35.52).
order. For each sample R, the number of blackbox calls required is the
number of points in R whose looked-up value is larger or equal to the looked-
up value of the sole minutia. Figure 5.5 gives the histogram of the number of
calls, and the average is 100. Note that the brute-force attacker on average
takes 156.5 calls.
5.4 Brute-force attacker for s > 1
The average speedup factor comparing to the brute-force attacker can be
estimated in the following ways. Consider a sample, which is a point set
R = {x1, x2, . . . , xm}. We can compute the likelihood of the actual minutiae
X. Recall that we estimate the likelihood of the set X by
∏
x∈X LookUp(x).






















Figure 5.5: Histogram of number of calls made by our attacker. Number of
Bins= 100, Bin Size= 2.97
order of decreasing likelihood. Thus, the number of blackbox calls required
to hit X is same as the number of candidates whose likelihood is larger than
that of X.
Now, consider the set L = {log(LookUp(x1)), . . . ,
log(LookUp(xm))}. By Central Limit Theorem, the distribution of the sum
of s randomly chosen numbers from L can be approximated by a normal
distribution, whose mean and variance can be derived from the mean and
variance of L. From this normal distribution, we can estimate the proportion
of subsets of R whose likelihood is larger than that of X. Assuming that the
candidates are randomly located among all subsets of R, we can obtain the
speedup factor provided by the attacker.
Figure 5.6 shows the histogram of the speedup factor, when s = 38 and
expected number of points in R is 312.6. The average speedup for the 10000
















log10 ( Speedup Factor )
Speedup Factor(likehood)
Speedup Factor(idendity function)
Figure 5.6: Comparison on speedup factor. Using the likelihood or identity
function as the lookup table.
for the same s, but using a different LookUp. Here, we simply choose the
identity function as the lookup function. Interestingly, the average improves
to 2192.7, and the geometric mean reduces to 13.88. Observe that for some
samples, the speedup factor reaches 107. This is undesirable in security appli-
cations because it indicates that, with some probability, small but noticeable,
the attack can be very successful.
5.5 Entropy loss
We want to estimate the min-entropy of the minutiae set X given the white
noise sketch R, that is, H˜∞(X|R). Note that each sample R is a randomly
chosen white noise sketch. Now, using the approximation in (4.2), the set
{x1, x2, . . . , xs} that maximizes the conditional probability Pr(X = {x1, . . . ,
xs}|R) is the set with s largest looked-up value. Hence, for a sample R,
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we can obtain maxa Pr(X = a|R). By averaging over all samples, we have a
lower bound of min-entropy of X given the white noise sketch. When s = 38,
the min-entropy is at most 61.2 bits. In other words, by making the white
noise sketch public, the min-entropy of the minutiae is reduced to at most
61.2.
The above estimate does not consider the replacement sketch. The en-
tropy loss of many set-difference schemes is known. For example, if we employ
the scheme by Juels et al. [11], and the replacement noise is t = 3, then the
entropy loss due to the replacement sketch is at least 2t log2 |R| < 49.72. As
an approximation, let us assume that the replacement sketch is generated
independently from the white noise sketch. Then, the min-entropy given
the sketch PX is at most 61.2 − 49.72 = 11.48. From this value, we find
the fingerprint vault scheme is not ideal since the sketch reveals too much
information.
5.6 Online Parking with Fixed Number of
Chaff
In previous sections, we employ the first stopping condition for online parking
process (that is, the process stops when it is impossible to add any more chaff
points). It would be interesting to investigate the second stopping condition
which stops at a fixed number of chaff points. We conduct experiments with





















Figure 5.7: Conditional probability whereby the online parking generates
fixed number of chaff points. The figure shows Pr(Ax < s|F (x) = f) where
m, the number of chaff points, is 250, 200,or 150, and s = 38. The domain
is [0, n]× [0, n], where n is 10.7.
result is illustrated in Figure 5.7. Observe that the conditional probability is
still increasing although for smaller m, it increases more gradually.
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Chapter 6
Design AMAC for 2-D Point
Set Templates
6.1 General Approach
Our AMAC for 2-D point set protocol consists of three functions: AMAC
trainer ftrainer, AMAC generator fgenerator and AMAC verifier fverifier.
ftrainer is a function which trains the AMAC protocol using a large number
of real sample templates using principle components analysis (PCA). It takes
in templates with secret key - a set of feature lines, and outputs a projection
basis which serves as key of AMAC for 2D point set together with the set of
feature lines.
fgenerator is a function which generates the AMAC codes. It takes in a
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template and outputs a fixed length binary code using keys generated in
ftrainer process.
fverifier is a function which verify whether a given template matches an
AMAC code. It takes in a template with an AMAC code, and outputs YES
or NO based on whether the given template could map to an AMAC close
enough to the given AMAC code.
6.2 The Model of 2-D Point Set Templates
Definition 3. A template is a 2 dimension abstract point sets extracted from
fingerprint minutiae sets, images or other documents.
The abstract points of a template could be minutiae points in the finger-
print context, or pixels whose characteristic values are above certain thresh-
old, in an image context. The template is defined in 2 dimension space
because we intend to preserve positioning information of each abstract point
from 2-D biometric message. Hence each point would have a pair of x-y
coordinates indicating its position. We define the template to be a domain
of [0, n]× [0, n] unless stating specifically.
Definition 4. A feature line l is a line intersecting with a template which
divides a template into two parts geographically. We denote the line function
of l: ax + b + cy = 0, or more generally, fl(x, y) = ax + b + cy, where
fl(x, y) = 0.
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In this thesis, a feature line is generated as by following ways: firstly, we
uniformly and randomly pick a point p in the template domain; secondly,
a degree θ between the line and the horizontal x-axis is chosen uniformly
from [0, π). This two value could determine a unique line that intersects the
template.
Definition 5. A feature value of a feature line l on template X is defined
as FVX(l) = |AX | − |BX |, where AX = {(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ X ∧ fl(x, y) < 0} and
BX = {(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ X ∧ fl(x, y) ≥ 0}. In the cases with no confusions, we
omit the X and denote the feature value associate to l as FV (l).
Definition 6. A feature vector is of the form vX = (v1, v2, ..., vm), where
vi = FVX(li), li are feature lines from i = 1, ..., m.
Definition 7. A robust hash function on point sets M is a function RH:
M→ {0, 1}k such that both sensitivity and robustness are guaranteed:
1. Robustness : if m1, m2 ∈ M and dist1(m1, m2) < δ1 for some small
δ1, we have dist2(RH(m1), RH(m2)) < d1 for some small d1.
2. Sensitivity : if m1, m2 ∈ M and dist1(m1, m2) > δ2 for some small
δ2, we have dist2(RH(m1), RH(m2)) > d2 for some d2.
where δ1 < δ2, d1 < d2, dist1(, ) is a function measures the difference between
two point set templates and dist2(, ) is a function measures the difference
between two hashes.
We will relax the sensitivity rule in the definition such that, if dist1(m1, m2) >
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δ2, there is very large probability (very close to 1) for dist2(RH(m1), RH(m2)) >
d2.
Definition 8. An approximate message authentication code for 2-D point set
is a robustness hash function on 2-D point sets with relaxed sensitivity rule.
Definition 9. We model our noises occurs in a 2-D point set template as
either of the following cases:
1. Some points in old template perturb to new locations nearby in the new
template.
2. Some original points may be missing in the new template
3. Some new points may appear in the new template.
In fingerprint template context, the first type of noise is mentioned as
white noise, and the second and third types of noise is mentioned as replace-
ment noise, which we have introduced in Chapter 1, See Figure 1.1. We
assume for the first kind of noise, the perturb distance is not larger than γ,
otherwise the noise will be treated as we firstly lose the original point and
then introduce a new point.
In the next section, we formally define our robust hash function: approx-
imate message authentication code for 2-D point set templates.
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6.3 Approximate Message Authentication Code
for 2-D Point Set Templates
Fingerprint templates are minutiae with x-y coordinates, which forms 2-D
point-sets. The positioning between the minutiae, as well as the number
of minutiae are the key information of a fingerprint template. In order to
capture the different positions of minutiae, we use the secret key mentioned
previously- the feature line sets. Since every line divides a template into two
parts, the points in a template could be on either sides of a line. With the
help of many such lines, the information about the positions of points in a
template could be captured uniquely. For other images templates, we could
set the similar approach, except the definition of points is change to pixels
or pixel with characteristic value higher than a threshold.
Our AMAC for 2-D point set proposal consists of three functions: AMAC
trainer ftrainer, AMAC generator fgenerator and AMAC verifier fverifier, as
Table 6.3, Table 6.3 and Table 6.3 shown. We first obtain the AMAC keys
from ftrainer. Then we could produce AMAC code for any 2-D point set




Input: large number of sample templates
Output: a projection basis u
Key: a set of secret feature lines
1 For each template
2 feature vector = Feature Vector Generation ( template, feature lines )
3 I = feature vector matrix
4 u = basis generation using PCA
5 output u
Table 6.1: Pseudo-code for Function ftrainer
Function name: fgenerator
Input: a template
Output: a fixed length (e.g 128 bit) binary AMAC code
Key: a set of secret feature lines, a projection basis u
1 feature vector = Feature Vector Generation ( template, feature lines )
2 projected vector = Project to basis u (feature vector)
3 AMAC = Map projected vector to AMAC (projected vector)
4 output AMAC
Table 6.2: Pseudo-code for Function fgenerator
Function name: fverifier
Input: a template, an AMAC
Output: YES or No
Key: a set of secret feature lines, a projection basis u
1 AMAC’= fgenerator(template);
2 Distance = Number of Different Bits(AMAC’, AMAC);




Table 6.3: Pseudo-code for Function fverifier
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6.4 Feature Vectors Generation
For a given set of feature lines {l1, l2, ..., ln}, we generate feature vector vXi =
(FVXi(l1), FVXi(l2), ..., FVXi(ln)) for any given template Xi.
In case we are in ftrainer function, we need to use many possible Xi to
build a feature vector matrix for future processing by PCA.
In case we are in fgenerator, vXi will be used later for being projected to a
projection basis obtained in ftrainer.
6.5 Obtain Projection Basis using PCA
PCA[10] process trains the AMAC generator using large samples of possible
input biometric templates. PCA stands for Principle Components Analysis,
which is a technique that can be used to simplify a dataset. It reduces the
dimensions of the original dataset while retains those characteristics that
contribute to the dataset most.
PCA first takes large number of feature vectors obtained in the previous
steps to form a matrix In×m of size n × m, where each row represents a
feature vector on a template, and each column represents the possible feature
values associate to a specific feature line. Notice the column vector of I may
be correlated as shown in Figure 6.1. Line l1 and l2 are symmetric, the
feature values of these two feature lines tends to satisfy the relationship









Figure 6.1: Illustration of two correlated feature lines, y = 1.5x and y =
−1.5x. There feature values of these two lines tends to be the same if the
underlaying point sets follows Poisson arrival process.
It then produces the covariance matrix of I, which is denoted as Cm×m,
where Ci,j = Cov(Columni(I), Columnj(I)). An SVD (Singular Value De-
composition) [19] process is applied to decomposite C to three matrix U S
and V to remove the correlations between Columni(I) and Columnj(I) for
any pair of i, j. U is the transformation matrix we are most interested in.
Its column vectors are eigenvectors, which are orthogonal to each other with
unit length. The correlations between each features are reduced to 0 statis-
tically. We will denote U as (u1, u2, ...um), where each ui is a column vector.
There might be thousands of characteristics in the original dataset, but the
column vectors ui in U are the most significant ones. The weight of each ui
is indicated in the diagonal matrix S and the weight is in decreasing order
from u1, u2, ..., um. Further more, the projected value of any vectors to the
basis U has the largest variance on u1, the second largest variance on u2 and
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so on.
6.6 Project Feature Vectors to PCA Basis
In the section 6.5, we obtain an orthogonal basis U = (u1, u2, ..., um). By
inner producting a feature vector v with each ui, we could get the projected
vector vproj(U) of v on basis U , i.e. vproj(U) = v · (u1, u2, ..., um).
Figure 6.2: Illustration of how PCA amplify the noises. ”+” are feature
points.
The projected vector vproj(U) maximizes the variance for each projected
values. The difference of two input data is well separated by the most dif-
ferent directions using PCA analysis. For example, as Figure 6.2 shows,
according to the mechanism of PCA, the distribution of feature points will
produce a basis consists of two eigenvectors along x′ and y′ directions. In fact,
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we see along x′ direction, there should be no difference between two vectors
V1 and V2, and during y
′ direction, there should be
√
2(a− b)2 = √2|a− b|
difference. However, according to the original x-y coordinates system, we
find at both direction, namely x direction and y direction, the difference be-
tween V1 and V2 is both |a − b|. The original x-y system didn’t catch the
features/characteristics of this two vectors. If we employ the rule that the
AMAC fverifier will reject a fingerprint/image if the distance to the original
copy on any direction is larger than 1.2 ∗ |a− b|, the PCA version of AMAC
verifier will reject the v2’s declaration to be v1. This shows that the AMAC
protocol using PCA is more sensitive to the noises.
Once we obtained vproj(U), we guarantee the robustness of our AMAC
protocol such that if the difference between two files is smaller than certain
threshold, we produce two projected vectors are within certain distance. In
contrast, with very high probability, if two projected vectors are close enough,
the original feature vectors are also close.
6.7 Map Projected Vector to Fixed Binary
String as AMAC
Without concerning of fixed length output bit strings of AMAC protocol re-
quirement, we could have directly output the projected vector as the approx-
imate message authentication code for 2-D point set. Or else, if we just want
to have probabilistic comparison functions, we simply measure the distance
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of two projected vector and set a threshold.
However, as for the requirement of a AMAC function, we need this step
to produce fixed length output. We propose a simple function fq which
quantizes the projected vector to a fixed length string.
Definition 10. fq: M → {0, 1}n is a quantize function which satisfying
following condition: ∀(x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ M,if xi − xi ≥ 0, output i-th bit of
AMAC as 1, otherwise the i-th bit of AMAC is 0. xi is the mean value of xi.
Sometimes the number of projected values n in a projected vector might
still be large (e.g. n = 400) if we chose large number of feature lines, whereas
a typical AMAC code would have only 64-bit or 128-bit length. By exploring
the properties of PCA, we notice that:
1. The variance of each projected value is strictly decreasing in order.
Namely, V ar(x1) > V ar(x2) > ... > V ar(xn).
2. The weight of each eigenvector is strictly decreasing in order. Namely,
for a basis (u1, u2, ..., un),Weight(u1) > Weight(u2) > ... > Weight(un).
Since the most significant projected values are those leading in the front
of the projected vector, the most sensitive bits of the AMAC responding to
the noises are also those leading bits. Hence if we have obtained 400-bit
binary string from the fp function and we only want a 128-bit AMAC string,
we could chop the first 128 bits from the 400 bits string and output it as
the final AMAC string. We employ this idea in our AMAC on 2-D point set
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protocol. Another similar idea is to employ only 128 feature lines, so that in
the end, there would be just 128 bit AMAC output.
An alternative strategy is to choose only 128 bits from the output 400 bit
string. We may keep the selection process as secret.
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Chapter 7
Analysis of AMAC for 2-D
point sets
In this section, we analyze the robustness and sensitivity properties of the
AMAC for 2-D point set protocol.
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7.1 Notations
n : Number of feature lines cutting the template
s : Number of points in the template
r : Number of noises
γ : Range of perturbing noises
k : Length of AMAC bit string
cmax : max(|uij |), for all i, j in a projection basis.
σ2i : Variance of a distribution
µi : Mean value of a distribution
7.2 Upper Boundary for Effective Distance
Due to Noises
Definition 11. Given the final output AMAC of length k, the effective dis-
tance between two projected vectors v1 = (x1, x2, ..., xn) and v2 = (y1, y2, ..., yn)
is defined as ‖v1 − v2‖e =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + (x2 − y2)2 + ... + (xk − yk)2, where
k ≤ n.
The purpose of introducing effective distance is we only need k bits in
the final AMAC, which equals to have only first k projected values in the
projected vector. Hence, the effective distance between two projected vectors
is limited to the first k projected values.
Definition 12. We define k-noise as following: the point set X ′ differs from
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X by only k points, and each of the k points follows one of the noise types
defined in Definition 9. A single noise is a k-noise where k = 1.
Lemma 1. If a single noise happens in a template, the effective distance




Proof. In the worst case, a single noise in a template will affect all the feature
lines intersecting with that template.(e.g. a point’s missing). Suppose the
difference between the two feature vectors is (△x1,△x2, ...,△xn). Since there
is only 1 noise, hence every the feature value for every line changes at most by
2, i.e. | △ xi| ≤ 2 for all i. Assume the basis matrix for PCA transformation
is 
y1,1 y1,2 ... y1,n
y2,1 y2,2 ... y2,n
... ... ... ...
yn,1 yn,2 ... yn,n

. Hence the effective distance:
Effective Distance =
√
(△x1y1,1 +△x2y2,1 + ...+△xnyn,1)2+
(△x1y1,2 +△x2y2,2 + ...+△xnyn,2)2 + ...+
(△x1y1,k +△x2y2,k + ... +△xnyn,k)2




Theorem 1. If the effective distance between two projected vector is larger
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than δ, there must be at least δ
2
√
kn·cmax noises between the original two tem-
plates.
Proof. Assume the number of noises is r, by Lemma 1, 1 noise will cause
at most 2
√
kn · cmax effective distance, hence, r noises will cause at most
δ = r × (2√kn · cmax) effective distance. Solve r we have r = δ2√kn·cmax .
7.3 Feature Value Changes Due to A Single
Point Noise
Figure 7.1: Illustration of probability of a random line intersecting with the
center circle.
Lemma 2. The probability pout that a random line doesn’t intersect with a




















Proof. The random line is generated by firstly selecting a point inside the
sphere region and secondly choosing an angle between 0 to π. Consider a
radius
−→
OA as Figure 7.1 shows, every line l will have cut any point on the
radius with probability 2pixdx
piR2
. Only when the degree of angle between l and
−→





















This means with probability pout, a noise happened will not affect a spe-
cific feature line. In fact, if the noise is of type 2 or 3, which introduce or
miss an abstract point, the feature value corresponding to any feature line
must be either increasing by 2, or decreasing by 2. Only the first type of
noise could achieve the fact that it is possible for a noise which doesn’t affect
any feature line.
Theorem 2. The probability that a perturb noise doesn’t change any feature











Proof. We model our perturb noise using the setting in previous lemma and
the result preserves.
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Theorem 3. The probability that a noise affects at least one of the n feature











Proof. We denote NC() as a function, which takes into a line, and outputs
the number of feature value is changed associating with this line if a perturb
noise happen. Since the feature lines are independent from each other,
Prob(NC(l1) = 0 ∧NC(l2) = 0 ∧ ... ∧NC(ln) = 0)
= Prob(NC(l1) = 0)× Prob(NC(l2) = 0)× ...× Prob(NC(ln) = 0)
= pout × pout × ...× pout
= pnout
Hence,
Prob(a noise affects at least 1 line)
≥ Prob(a perturb noise affects at least 1 line)
= 1− pnout
.
For σ = 0.01, n = 128, we have probability of 99.46% that at least 1
feature value will change due to this noise. And the more lines we use, e.g.
n = 400, the high probability (99.999992%) we guarantee a change in the
feature values.
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7.4 Probabilistic Lower Boundary for Effec-
tive Distance Due to Noises
We denote the vector (∆x1,∆x2, ...,∆xn) as the difference between the orig-
inal feature vector and the noisy version of feature vector. Since each feature
line is independent from each other, we have ∆xi are all independent from
each other.
Definition 13. If there are r noises happened in a template, we define the
change of each feature value ∆xi follows a Gaussian distribution, with mean
0, variance 2rρ, for some 0 < ρ < 1.




2 + ...+ y
2
n = 1,
we have w = ∆x1y1 + ∆x2y2 + ... + ∆xnyn approximately follows normal
distribution with E(w) = 0, V ar(w) = 2rρ.
Proof. This is by an approximation that, the sum of a large number of i.i.d
random variable follows a normal distribution. Since, ∆xi are all independent
from each other, yi are constant, we have the sum w following a normal
distribution. Notice that in PCA transformation basis, each column vector




i,k) = 1 for any column k.
E(w) = ΣE(∆xiyi) = Σ(yiE(∆xi)) = 0 and
V ar(w) = ΣV ar(∆xiyi) = Σ(y
2
i V ar(∆xi)) = 2rρΣ(y
2
i ) = 2rρ by defini-
tion 13.
Lemma 4. If X is a random variable follows normal distribution with mean
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), where a > 0, function erf
is the error function.
Proof. Since X follows normal distribution, Prob(X > a) = 1− Prob(X ≤
a) = 1 − 1
2














), the effective distance between




(∆x1y1,1 +∆x2y2,1 + ... +∆xnyn,1)2
+(∆x1y1,2 +∆x2y2,2 + ...+∆xnyn,2)2
+...
+(∆x1y1,k +∆x2y2,k + ...+∆xnyn,k)2




Where X follows a normal distribution, with mean 0 and variance 2rρ.









) by Lemma 4.




))k, the effective distance be-
tween two projected vectors is at least
√
ka, if two feature vectors are part
with r noises.
Proof. For each (∆x1y1,i +∆x2y2,i + ...+∆xnyn,i)
2 where i = 1, 2, ..., k, k is
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) to ensure it to be
larger than some a2. Hence, the probability for all of the k expressions to be











7.5 Preimage Attacks on AMAC
The design requirement of AMAC for 2-D point set is to resist the preimage
attacks. Namely, given output y, we are computationally infeasible to find an
input x such that y = AMAC(x). It could be viewed as robustness one-way
hash functions, where the key, namely the function AMAC, is either kept secret
or is so complicated that it is infeasible to find a trap door function. Our
magic is similar as other hash or MAC functions. However, instead of using
shifting and permutation, or mixed/shuﬄe columns and rows, we use feature
line sets as our secret key. We conjecture that, the feature lines combining
with PCA technique provide very high computational complexity to resist to
preimage attacks. Further more, by training our AMAC function using large
amount of homogenous inputs, we are able to amplify the noise level of two
similar template inputs, which facilities the detection about sensitivity.
Through extensive experimental comparisons, we find the distribution of
AMAC distance follows strictly the normal distribution. Suppose the sam-
ple template input space consists of templates which have µ1 mean AMAC
63
distance and σ21 distance variance. Assume the AMAC protocol successfully
authenticates a noisy version template T ′ of T if T ′ is within the range of
normal distribution with µ2 as mean, σ
2
2 as distance variance.
Theorem 5. The probability of finding a template maps to a AMAC code








































Proof. Since we assume the permissive noisy version of AMAC code follows
a normal distribution X2 with µ2 as mean, σ
2
2 as distance variance and the
average AMAC distance between two random templates also follows a nor-
mal distribution X1 with mean µ1 and variance σ
2
2. With the output AMAC
size k, we have,
Prob(a template maps to an AMAC with permissive noise)=
∫ k
0










































































































Figure 8.1: Probability density function for effective distance between two
random templates. Different feature line sets are used: random lines, grid
lines and triangle lines.
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8.1 Experiment Settings
In following experiments, we set the template space to be a square of size
100 by 100. 10000 feature points are distributed on the space using binary
approximation of Poisson process. 405 random feature lines are used and
they are independent with each other. We assume the final output AMAC
is of 128 binary bit length. The noise types are as defined in Definition 9.
The probability of noises is 50% for the 1st kind of perturbing noise and
50% for the 2nd and 3rd type of noises. We assume that if the perturbing
noise happens, a point will move to a random point within radius γ only.
We assume a newly introduced point may appear at any location, despite in
reality, for example, in fingerprint template, two minutiae points cannot be
too close to each other. All the probability density experiments are based on
10000 sample output.
Projection Basis The projection basis consists of two types, 1. we use
405 random feature lines and 10000 point sets, the points are generated using
approximation Poisson process; 2. we use 405 random feature lines and 10000
homogeneous point sets, the points sets are generated as the noisy version
of one point set, with 30% of points either perturbing with 1% of the length
of the space. Hence the first set of projection basis is more general and
suitable for the point sets which follows global patterns; the second set of
projection basis is more specific to a set of homogenous data which follows
specific patterns.
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8.2 Choosing Feature Lines
We use different sets of feature lines to check whether choosing different types
of feature lines will affect the result very much. We choose three sets of lines:
1. random which consists of 405 random lines, 2. grids which consists of
202 evenly distributed horizontal lines and 203 evenly distributed vertical
lines, 3. triangle which consists of 135 evenly distributed +60 degree lines,
135 evenly distributed -60 degree lines and 135 evenly distributed horizonal
lines. Using the first type of basis, it turns out that the effective distance
distributions are about the same regardless the choice of lines. Hence, the
lines could be regular, could be random, the result is not much affected,
See Figure 8.1. However, it doesn’t mean individual choice of lines is not
important. Recall that the feature lines will determine the feature values
and PCA process generate projection basis according to these values.
8.3 Choosing Different Noisy Levels
Using the first type of basis, we measure the relationship between noisy level
and the mean/variance of difference in AMAC code, as shown in Figure 8.2
and Figure 8.3. When the noisy points consists of 1% of the whole point set
points, on average, there would be 4.86 bits difference of a 128-bit AMAC
code with small variance 3.30. If there are 50 percent of noises, the mean




























Percentage of noise points
perturbing distance: 1 %
perturbing distance: 5 %
perturbuing distance: 10 %
Figure 8.2: Mean AMAC bit difference with difference noise levels and per-
turb ranges
8.4 Average AMAC Distance between Tem-
plates
For any two random copies of point set templates, we have the AMAC dis-
tance distribution using first type of basis as shown in Figure 8.4. The av-
erage bit difference (the right curve) between two AMACs is 64 bits, which
is fairly reasonable for an AMAC code with length 128 bit. Using the same
projection basis, we produce the AMAC distance distribution for two noisy
version AMACs. We find if 30% points are affected by noises, including 15%
percent of noise type 1 and 15% of noise type 2 and 3, we will have 21 bit
AMAC difference in mean(the left curve), assuming the perturbing distance
is within 1% range.
The distribution of the AMAC distance is helpful in calculating preimage
























Percentage of noise points
perturbing distance: 1 %
perturbing distance: 5 %
perturbuing distance: 10 %
Figure 8.3: Variance of AMAC bit difference with difference noise levels and
perturb ranges
bution approximation, we find given an AMAC, the probability to find a
template mapping to similar MAC(define similar to be the noisy settings
mentioned above) is less than 1.49 × 10−11. If we set the permitted noise
bound tighter, which only allows no more than 1% noises, the probability of
finding a template mapping to a MAC reduces to 1.10× 10−24.
It would also be interesting to see what happens if we train our AMAC
protocol using these homogeneous templates. As shown in Figure 8.5 (the
right side curve), if we generate the projection basis according to these ho-
mogeneous templates, which are noisy versions of some template X. The av-
erage AMAC distance between any two copies shifts from the left side curve
to the right side curve, and the mean distance would become 64 again. This
means, if we train the AMAC protocol with special pattern data, the AMAC
protocol is able to amplify the difference level as if they are two random























Distance in number of different bits
Distance between two random templates
Distance between a noisy version template to original
Figure 8.4: Probability density function for AMAC distance between (1) any
random two templates, (2) a noisy version to an original template. 30% of
the points are affected by noises, perturbing distance is within 1% of the
range size.























Number of different bits in AMAC
Basis on noisy templates 
Basis on random templates
Figure 8.5: AMAC distance distribution with different projection basis: (1)




Conclusion and Future Works
9.1 Conclusion
A fingerprint is typically represented as a set of minutiae which consists of
2-D points in authentication. In this thesis, we explore ways of extracting
consistent bits from such point set templates for robust authentication. This
thesis consists of two parts. In the first part, we show analysis of an exist-
ing method: Fingerprint vault [6] scheme. It produces a public sketch for
authentication by adding chaff points into the original minutiae set. By ob-
serving that a chaff point which comes later tends to have smaller free area,
we propose a method to find out the original minutiae from the vault on
average 2192.7 times faster than a brute-force attacker.
In the second part, we inspired by a robust authentication scheme-AMAC
for robust image authentication, where the message authentication informa-
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tion is kept as a small fixed length string. We propose an AMAC for 2-D
point set which extracts positioning information between points using fea-
ture lines and projects this information to appropriate Euclidean space using
PCA and a quantizing function. Given such a 128-bit length AMAC code,
to successfully launch a pre-image attack requires more than 281 trials. We
could further construct secure sketch using this extracted information since
it preserves locality information and yet sensitive to large tampers.
9.2 Future Works
In our implementation of approximate message authentication code for 2-
D point set templates, we use a quantize function which maps the projected
vectors to a binary code. It is a very simple mapping function, which outputs
1 if the projected value is above average value and outputs 0 otherwise. We
believe there are better quantize functions which keep more information and
produce more sensitive AMAC codes. Further more, since our projected vec-
tors shows locality preserving property, we may send them to secure sketches
to extract consistent bits. It is interesting to explore them in the future
work. Other than this, whether we could use other methods to generate
feature values instead of feature lines is also open for discussion.
We also feel a need to extract real point sets from fingerprint library or
handwritten images to study the effects of both attack and the AMAC for 2-
D point set scheme. With the specific patterns of the point set distributions,
we expect to find more reality and practical results of our works.
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